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These comments are directed at the version of Professor Boger's paper delivered at the conference.  
While that paper has now been revised, the commentary remains pertinent to the substance of what 
is said. –Eds. 
 
 
I don’t find it difficult to agree with Professor Boger on the “ontic” status of the quality 
of an argumentation. This is not difficult for me since my philosophical role model is Bernard 
Bolzano, who is famous for introducing into logical theory propositions or sentences “in 
themselves.” All logical relations are defined on these structures whose principal property is that 
they can be true or false. In Bolzano, logical properties, validity, consequence, etc. are indeed 
ontic properties. To appreciate Bolzano’s contribution we need only look at the understanding of 
logic in the 18th century, when it was assigned the task to explain the actual workings of the 
mind.  Logic, it was said, is to the mind what physics is to matter.1
But we must be cautious. Propositions are abstract objects that are defined by the 
structures in which they occur. This is not a very deep or problematic thought and can be 
explained using an analogy with money (fiat, not commodity or fiduciary money). When we 
know what it means to buy, to sell, to earn interest, to debit an account, etc. etc., and realize that 
coins and bills don’t become money until an account is debited, then we understand what money, 
or even what a dollar or a mark, really is. There is then no further question, no enlightenment by 
contemplating the relata of these various relations.  
It is a mistake to think of abstract objects, in particular those that live within structures, as 
occupying a Platonic or even mystical realm. Money may be mysterious, but it does not occupy a 
realm that is somehow beyond the world. Abstract objects, if I may say so, are right among us. 
And so it is with propositions. 
Bolzano reminds us of this when he says that what we say often implies our belief that 
there are propositions (just as we believe that there is money). 
 
Once it is recognized that it is necessary or even simply useful to speak of truths in 
themselves, i.e. to speak of truths irrespective of whether or not they have been 
recognized by anyone, and especially of the connection between them, then it will not be 
denied that the concept of propositions in themselves in the indicated sense deserves to be 
introduced into logic.2
 
This, I think, can be read as saying that the business at hand is to investigate the relations 
between propositions without asking for the essence of the relata, to assume a relaxed attitude 
toward these abstract objects, and not to worry too much about their status.  
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This creates certain problems for Professor Boger’s staunch endorsement of classical 
logic (which is bi-valent, with excluded middle). If the essence of the proposition is defined by 
the structure in which it lives, than we must expect, and will find, that the great variety of 
structures that can be designed lead to a greater variety of types of proposition than Boger wants 
to countenance. Sometime around the middle of the last century the Age Aquarius began to dawn 
for formal logic, when logicians began to do their own thing, which meant an explosion of logic 
systems: modal, para-consistent, relevance, quantum, intuitionist, many-valued, etc. etc.  
Boger writes “Formal logic has developed the notion of precision in thinking as exemplified in, 
for example, the ideal of a logically perfect language.” These days most formal logicians would 
deny that there is a logically perfect language. That ideal was still much argued in the 1950s, and 
arose from the conviction that most metaphysical conundrums, religious and political problems 
and even fanaticism had their root in the irrationality of ordinary discourse. We hear the 
following: 
 
On one of their walks, Bertrand Russell startled Lady Ottoline by announcing that he 
found it difficult to talk to ordinary mortals, “for the language they use is so inaccurate 
that to me it seems absurd.”3
 
Indeed, the bivalent logic of Principia Mathematica was thought by some (e. g. Gustav 
Bergmann) to be the ideal language. A classical text expressing great confidence in the salutary 
effect of formal logic instruction is Lillian Lieber's Mits, Wits and Logic of 1947, where Mits is 
the famous man in the street and Wits, obviously, the woman in the street.4
Lieber advocated universal logic instruction to prevent the recurrence of irrationality, as 
in Nazism, and avoid a nuclear confrontation. Since this would take a long time, universal 
disarmament and an international police force was needed as an emergency measure: a race is on 
between logic education and catastrophe (p. 50). 
 Lieber (who uses line-lengths scientifically adjusted to maximize comprehension) says:  
 
If you realize that...  
ONE WORLD 
has now become  
IMPERATIVE... 
then 
you may wish to read more about 
LOGIC, 
for you will need it 
if you are here 
“to tell the tale”(182 f.). 
 
Since Principia Logic does not allow for first person expressions (there is no “I” there, nor 
actually a “there”), egoism will diminish and communitarian democracy will prevail.  
 With the proliferation of logic systems, faith in an ideal language has diminished. Not 
only that, formal systems are designed to answer metaphysical desiderata, or views concerning 
the nature of mathematical proofs. Logic systems have become task oriented. For example, many 
mathematicians embrace intuitionist logic, which does not have a law of excluded middle, and a 
good thing it is.  
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 Consider this problem: can an irrational number raised to an irrational power be a rational 
number? With the law of excluded middle an easy but unhappy proof can be constructed: Take 
√2√2. Either this is rational or it is not (excluded middle). If it is, then you are done. If it is not, 
then raise √2 to the power of that number, which is the same as √2 squared, or 2. You are done, 
but have you succeeded?  
In sum, if propositions were as ontologically robust as Boger takes them to be, then one 
could speak with more assurance of their properties. But they are defined by their contexts, and 
the contexts are developed to meet certain extra-logical objectives. Hence much of what he says 
must be viewed with caution.  
No doubt the discipline of formal logic can inform and advance argumentation theory. 
But there are certain limits that need to be heeded. Consider Aristotle on the syllogism: 
 
A syllogism is a logos in which, certain things having been laid down, something other 
than what has been laid down follows of necessity from their being so (Prior Analytics 
24b18).  
 
“Syllogism” is here not taken in the technical sense developed later, but means to cover 
deductive arguments in general. It is important to note that Aristotle does not first define 
“argument in general” and then “valid argument” as a species of arguments. Rather he directly 
and only defines “valid argument,” a practice that formal logic has followed ever since. 
Obviously, if some speech act fails to be a valid argument, it need not be an invalid argument, 
but could be a sonnet or a limerick. A system that contains only a definition of “valid argument” 
cannot well come to grips with arguments in general, with arguments that fail, with arguments 
that need to be supplemented. 
Professor Boger is more careful and does indeed define “argument” (and later 
“argumentation”). 
 
Let us define a premise-conclusion (P-c) argument to be a two-part system consisting in a 
set of propositions called premises (P) and a single proposition called a conclusion (c). In 
a valid argument the premise propositions imply the conclusion proposition; the 
conclusion proposition is a logical consequence of the premise propositions. 
 
Suppose you find a basket of propositions (comprehensible, no tricks), each on a separate slip of 
paper. You comb through them to determine if there are valid arguments in the basket, that is, 
systems that fulfill Boger’s or some other definition of validity. This is a doable thing. You 
remove all valid arguments, leaving a remainder of propositions that cannot be arranged in 
systems that are valid arguments.  Are there then any arguments left in the basket? I should think 
not. “Valid argument” is defined syntactically or semantically in such a way that they can be 
selected from random collections of sentences. But the same is not true for arguments in general. 
A speech act is an argument if some of the sentences in the system are presented or meant as 
premises, others as conclusions. Arguments are inevitably wedded to the intensions of their 
authors and cannot be understood without them.  
To illustrate, a while ago Michael Burke analyzed a number of cases of “denying the 
antecedent” in logic text books. An example:  
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Total pacifism is a good principle if everyone follows it. But not everyone follows it. 
Therefore it is not a good principle.5  
 
It instantiates a logical fallacy and formal analysis, indeed just a truth table, can easily show this 
to be invalid. But why then is it so persuasive? Is this due to a universal weakness of human 
reason, or is there some other explanation? Burke suggests that only the categorical sentence is 
meant as a premiss, the conditional playing another role too complex to review here. What we 
have, then, is an enthymeme, with an additional commentary. Formal analysis of this discourse 
shows it either to be a notorious fallacy, or, if Burke is right, another, nameless, fallacy. For the 
formal logician, enthymemes typically remain below the radar screen, cast into the same 
darkness as the grossest non-sequiturs: according to Boger, any argumentation whose conclusion 
is not a logical consequence of the premiss set is a fallacy. This is pretty harsh. Enthymemes 
have interesting formal properties, and, indeed, can be separated into valid and invalid.6  
One last point. Boger writes: 
 
Another way of expressing validity is to say that in a valid argument all the information 
in the conclusion proposition is already contained in the premise propositions (Corcoran 
1998).   
 
In the classical system he describes, an inconsistent premiss set implies every conclusion. 
Accordingly, an inconsistent set of sentences contains all the information there is. This can’t be 
so.  
In sum, I disagree with a number of details in Boger’s argument, but am in sympathy 
with its general drift, particularly if he agreed to let go of the monopoly of classical logic. One 
task of discourse analysis must indeed be the analysis of abstract objects and their relations, 
which is an investigation of their ontic properties.  
 
 
Notes 
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